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Abstract
We analyse the short-time work (STW) regulations that several OECD countries introduced
after the 2007 financial crisis. We view these measures as a collection of real options and
study the dynamic effect of STW on the endogenous liquidation decision of the firm. While
STW delays a firm’s liquidation, it is not necessarily welfare enhancing. Moreover, it turns
out that firms use STW too long. We show (numerically) that providers of capital benefit
more than employees from STW. Benefits for employees can even be negative. A typical
Nordic policy performs better than a typical Anglo-Saxon policy for all stakeholders.
Keywords Temporary unemployment · Real options · Dynamic cost-benefit analysis
JEL Classification G33 · G38 · H53
1 Introduction
Many commonly-used economic policies have welfare effects that depend crucially on eco-
nomic agents’ timing decisions. As an example take short-time work (STW) arrangements,
which are used to reduce the number of lay-offs in economically challenging times by tem-
porarily allowing employers to reduce the hours worked by their employees. Even though
there are many differences in the precise rules governing STW in different countries (such
as eligibility criteria, duration, etc.) the basic idea is similar: rather than laying off workers,
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firms are allowed to put employees on reduced hours. Affected workers are compensated for
the resulting loss in wage income, partly by employers and partly by the government.1
In order to make a full welfare analysis of an STW policy one needs to know by how
much both the costs to the government and the benefits to the workers should be discounted.
Both these discount factors depend on the timing decisions of the firm: when (if ever) it
enters STW, when (if ever) it exists, when (if ever) it liquidates. These decisions, in turn,
will depend on the underlying, uncertain, state of the economy as relevant to the firm. The
discounted costs and benefits of STW will, thus, depend on firms’ timing decisions under
future uncertainty. To facilitate the analysis of STW it helps to view it as providing the firm
with a collection of real options. First it has an option to enter STW. Once this option is
exercised it has an option to either liquidate or leave STW. If the firm exits STW it again has
an option to liquidate. This concatenation of options makes valuing STW measures in general
a difficult problem, especially in a general equilibrium framework. Therefore, in this paper
we focus on the value of STW to the firm and its constituents: its shareholders, employees,
and providers of capital.
This paper analyses three issues related to STW that have been addressed to some extent
in the literature, but will be studied here in a dynamic stochastic framework that focusses
on the incentives it creates for employers. First, it has been argued [2] that, while from
the employee’s point of view STW is preferable to lay-offs, they are close substitutes for
employers. However, since laying off staff is an (at least partly) irreversible decision, while
STW is not, the option of STW has economic value to the firm.
A second, related, issue is the concern that STW can lead to inefficient reductions in
working hours (cf. [19]) for which some empirical evidence has been found [7]. We find a
theoretical reason for this inefficiency, linked to the option value that STW presents. Most
countries have provisions that preclude firms from signing up to STW if and when they like.
This adds a degree of irreversibility to the decision to leave STW once a firm is using it. This
irreversibility, in turn, creates an option value of waiting, which gives the firm a disincentive
to return employees to full hours. This effect is driven purely by irreversibility and uncertainty
over the firm’s prospects and affects even risk-neutral firms.
A third question is related to who benefits most from STW. We analyse a typical situation
where the firm’s production technology is of the Cobb–Douglas type with two inputs: capital
and labour. In that set-up, labour is “rented” from labourers and capital goods are rented
from providers of capital goods, who we shall refer to here as “capitalists”. Shareholders
claim the firm’s profits. It is assumed that managers maximize shareholder value, that there
are no agency issues, and that the firm is 100% equity-financed. So, although we can think
of workers and capitalists as stakeholders in the firm, we view them as outsiders who have
no agency in the firm’s decision making. In particular, the capitalists are not the providers
of (financial) capital; rather, they are providers of the capital goods that the firm rents for its
production process.
STW is usually introduced by appealing to the advantages that it has for workers. Indeed,
STW delays or prevents workers from being laid-off and, hence, reduces the present value of
the sunk-costs of being made redundant, estimated to be some 11% of life-time earnings [8].
However, STW is also beneficial to the providers of the firm’s capital goods (“capitalists”)
and shareholders. Capitalists benefit, because they get fully paid for the capital stock through-
out the STW period. Shareholders benefit, because STW gives them additional options in
managing the firm, which have a positive value. So, from the firm’s perspective STW and
1 In 2011, STW measures were in place in 25 of 33 OECD countries with take-up rates being as high as
7.4% of employees in some countries in 2009 [7]. It has been estimated, for example, that STW has saved
5000–6000 jobs in the Netherlands alone [13].
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liquidation are not close substitutes. This is because liquidation is irreversible, while using
STW is not. So, STW gives the firm additional flexibility to deal with unfavourable economic
circumstances, which has economic value for the firm.
We perform a numerical analysis of our model to study its features in more detail. This
analysis is based on two examples of typical STW policies, that we call the “Anglo-Saxon”
and the “Nordic” policy. These proto-typical policies are averages of policies as have been
documented in the literature (see [7]) of some Anglo-Saxon and Nordic countries, respec-
tively. The main difference between these policies is that the Nordic countries, typically,
allow firms to cut into normal production levels more deeply, while permitting lower salary
reductions.
From this numerical analysis we find that, from a social welfare perspective, firms use STW
too long. This is related to the option value of STW: leaving STW is an irreversible decision.
This irreversibility gives the firm an option to use STW longer than it otherwise would. These
two effects may also give a different explanation to the observed lag between macro variables
and labour adjustment as analysed by van Wijnbergen and Willems [21]. Secondly, we find
that, on the whole, the providers of capital goods benefit more from STW than providers of
labour. In addition, all interested parties (providers of capital goods and labour services, as
well as shareholders) are better off in a typical Nordic programme than in a typical Anglo-
Saxon programme. Finally, in all cases, the benefit-to-cost ratio is significantly below unity,
indicating the importance of a stochastic dynamic approach to analysing measures like STW.
In general we find that the benefits and costs of STW measures are very sensitive to the
policy’s parameters and that no clear policy prescriptions emerge. This point is also made in
some recent empirical work on STW measures by Boeri and Bruecker [6].
The paper uses a real options approach to the analysis of unemployment insurance by
focussing on the effects of irreversibility and uncertainty on the value of STW measures to
the firm. The use of real options analysis is well-established in the analysis of economic
decision making. Since the seminal contributions of McDonald and Siegel [16] and Dixit
and Pindyck [10] there has been a burgeoning literature on applications of the real options
approach. For example, Abel and Eberly [1] and Dixit [9] use the framework to analyse
optimal investment in the production factors in a firm, Bar–Ilan and Strange [3] use it to
investigate the consequences of construction lags on optimal investment decision. In a recent
contribution, Kellogg [14] gives evidence that the decision rules that theoretic real options
models prescribe are consistent with actual firm behaviour.
Not much theoretical work has been conducted in the use of STW to dampen the effects
of the recent recession. Some contributions, like Bentolila et al. [4] focus on labour market
flexibility, in particular the use of temporary workers, as an explanation for the different
effects of the recession in different labour markets. To our knowledge, our paper is the first
that applies a real options framework to STW. In general, there are few contributions that
focus on the optionality that labour-market policies confers on employers. In fact, most
contributions abstract away from this and focus on issues such as moral hazard; see, e.g.
Blanchard and Tirole [5] who focus on the effect of unemployment insurance and protection
on optimal wage contracts between employer and worker, and Kolsrud et al. [15], who focus
on optimal timing of (un-) employment by workers.
In this paper, we choose not to model the workers’ side of the labour market at all. There are
concerns that STW unduly advantages workers employed in firms that can use STW, although
there is no conclusive evidence that this really takes place [7]. In addition, it can be argued
that during times of economic hardship, which STW measures are designed to alleviate,
the labour market will not be very “liquid”, making it difficult for workers to switch jobs.
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Finally, a focus on the firm allows for analytical solutions and a clear understanding how
irreversibility and uncertainty drive the value of STW.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2 we set up the model and derive the firm’s
optimal policy by valuing three subsequent (real) options implied by a (stylized) model of
STW. The effects of STW on liquidation probabilities and welfare are analysed in Sects. 3
and 4, respectively. Some concluding remarks are given in Sect. 5.
2 Optimal use of short-time work by ﬁrms
As mentioned in Sect. 1, the details of STW measures vary substantially across countries,
although the main idea is the same: employers can put staff on reduced hours, while the
government partially compensates for lost wage earnings. In this section we will study the
effect of STW on the firm’s liquidation decision. The main idea of our model is that STW
provides the firm with an option to postpone an irreversible liquidation decision by lowering
its production level, which reduces its (stochastic) revenues as well as its (deterministic) costs.
This generates a trade-off for the firm where STW is attractive when its sales price is low, but
not when it is high; an assumption that we will formalize below (cf. Assumption 1). As far as
the details of the STW measure, we make the following additional simplifying assumptions.
First the firm can use STW only once, second the option to use STW is infinitely lived, third
the use of STW does not involve sunk costs and fourth the firm can decide itself when to stop
STW.
The second and third assumptions are, arguably, the most unrealistic ones. Both are made
for technical convenience and can be relaxed. However, when options are not infinitely lived
no analytical results can be obtained, although it has been shown that even for moderate finite
life times the (numerically obtained) solutions are very similar to those obtained analytically
under an infinite time horizon [11]. The assumption that the use of STW does not involve
sunk costs implies that a firm will use STW sooner than in the case that sunk costs are present.
The result that sunk costs delay investment is standard in the literature2 and the same intuition
applies here as well.
Our assumptions imply that the firm has three subsequent options. First the option to
enter STW. Second, once entered, the firm has the options to (i) exit STW and return to
normal production, or (ii) to liquidate. Third, if the firm decided to exit STW and return to
normal production, then it now has an option to liquidate. Since our stochastic process will
be strongly Markovian, we can value these three options successively, starting with the final
one.
2.1 The value of an active firm that has already used STW
In this section we analyse the value of a firm that is currently active in a market and has already
used STW. Such a firm no longer has an option to enter STW and we will assume that the
only option that is left to the firm is to liquidate at a time of its choosing. Liquidation implies
laying off all workers and retiring all capital stock. We make the following two simplifying
assumptions. First, upon liquidation the firm does not receive a scrap value for its capital
stock and, second, liquidation does not involve sunk costs.
The crucial ingredient in our model is that the evolution of the firm’s revenues is subject
to uncertainty. Uncertainty is modeled on a measurable space (,F ). We consider a family
2 See, for example, [10, Chapter 6].
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of probability measures Py , y ∈ R+, on (,F ). A particular firm is assumed to have a
cash inflow that is given by QN Y , where QN is the production level of the firm and Y is
the stochastically evolving price level, which under Py , evolves according to the geometric
Brownian motion (GBM),
dYt = μYt dt + σYt dzt , Y0 = y, Py -a.s.,
where (zt )t≥0 is a Wiener process. Information is modeled by the filtration generated by this
GBM, augmented with the Py-null sets, and is denoted by (Ft )t≥0.
It is assumed that under normal conditions the firm produces a quantity QN at a cost cN ,
and that it discounts profits at a constant rate r > μ.3
The present value (under Py) of an operational firm without the liquidation option is
FN (y) = Ey
[∫ ∞
0
e−r t (QN Yt − cN ) dt
]
= QN y
r − μ −
cN
r
.
The firm’s value with the liquidation option is the solution to the optimal stopping problem
F∗N (y) = sup
τ∈M
Ey
[∫ τ
0
e−r t (QN Yt − cN ) dt
]
= FN (y) + sup
τ∈M
Ey
[
e−rτ (−FN (Yτ ))
]
, (1)
where M is the set of stopping times relative to the filtration (Ft )t≥0.
The optimal stopping problem (1) is standard and can easily be solved; see, for example
[17, Exercise 10.12]. It turns out that the optimal liquidation time is the first hitting time
(from above) of an endogenously determined threshold of the stochastic process Y , which
we shall denote by Y ∗N . As this result is standard, it will be summarized in a proposition
without proof. The interested reader is referred to Dixit and Pindyck [10], Stokey [20], or
Øksendal [17] for proofs. In the remainder, let τˇ (Y ∗N ) := inf{t ≥ 0|Yt ≤ Y ∗N } denote the first
hitting time (from above) of the trigger Y ∗N .
Proposition 1 The stopping time τˇ (Y ∗N ), with
Y ∗N =
β2
β2 − 1
r − μ
QN
cN
r
,
where β2 < 0 is the negative root of the quadratic equation
1
2
σ 2β(β − 1) + μβ − r = 0, (2)
solves the optimal stopping problem (1). Moreover, the corresponding value function is
F∗N (y) =
⎧⎨
⎩
QN y
r−μ − cNr +
(
y
Y ∗N
)β2 [ cN
r
− QN Y ∗N
r−μ
]
if y > Y ∗N ,
0 if y ≤ Y ∗N .
(3)
Note that the value function F∗N is C1 onR+ and C2 onR+\{Y ∗N }.
The value function in (3) has a straightforward interpretation. For y ≤ Y ∗N , the firm
liquidates immediately and its value is, thus, zero. For y > Y ∗N the firm’s value consists of
the expected present value of always producing QN at cost cN , corrected for the fact that at
some point in the future the threshold Y ∗N may be reached. The expected discount factor of
this event is (y/Y ∗N )β2 .
3 This assumption ensures that the present value of profits is finite in our infinite horizon model.
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2.2 The value of a firm currently using STW
Once the firm has decided to enter STW it has two, inter-related options:
1. leave STW and return to normal production;
2. leave STW and liquidate.
This problem has two aspects: (i) the optimal decision time has to be determined and (ii) the
optimal decision at that time has to be determined. Of course, STW only makes sense if it
allows firms to reduce costs by lowering the wage bill through reduced hours for its workers.
Therefore, the per-period costs during STW are assumed to be constant and equal to cP ∈
(0, cN ). The quid pro quo is that the firm will produce less than before, say Q P ∈ (0, QN ).
We will assume that, on average, normal production is more profitable than production in
STW.
Assumption 1 The production and cost levels in STW, Q P and cP , are such that QN /cN >
Q P/cP .
Essentially this assumption says that QN is a more efficient production level than Q P . If it
is violated then the firm may never wish to leave STW once it has entered.
The value of an active firm using STW with the two exit options described above, can
now be written as the optimal stopping problem
F∗P (y) = sup
τ∈M
Ey
[ ∫ τ
0
e−r t (Q P Yt − cP )dt + e−rτ max
{
F∗N (Yτ ), 0
}]
= sup
τ∈M
Ey
[ ∫ τ
0
e−r t (Q P Yt − cP )dt + e−rτ F∗N (Yτ )
]
. (4)
Note that the gain function is C1 everywhere, so that problem (4) is fairly standard. We
hypothesize that the state space can be split up in a continuation region (0, Y ∗L ) ∪ (Y ∗H ,∞)
and a stopping region [Y ∗L , Y ∗H ]. So, the optimal stopping time, τ ∗L,H would be
τ ∗L,H = τˆ (Y ∗H ) ∧ τˇ (Y ∗L ), (5)
where τˆ (Y ∗H ) := inf{t ≥ 0|Yt ≥ Y ∗H }. This intuition will be verified in Proposition 2 below.
The resulting value function turns out to be C1 everywhere and C2 onR+\{Y ∗L , Y ∗H }.
An STW policy only makes sense if a firm that uses STW liquidates later than a firm that
does not. It will be seen later that the following assumption ensures that Y ∗L < Y ∗N .
Assumption 2 For the unique solution YˆH > Y ∗N to the equation
β1β2
β1 − β2
( Q P Y ∗N
r − μ −
cP
r
)⎡
⎣
(
YˆH
Y ∗N
)β1
−
(
YˆH
Y ∗N
)β2⎤⎦
− Q P Y
∗
N /(r − μ)
β1 − β2
⎡
⎣β1
(
YˆH
Y ∗N
)β1
− β2
(
YˆH
Y ∗N
)β2⎤⎦
= QN − Q P
r − μ YˆH + β2
(
YˆH
Y ∗N
)β2 [
cN
r
− QN Y
∗
N
r − μ
]
, (6)
it holds that
(β2 − 1)Q pY ∗N /(r − μ) − β2cP/r
β1 − β2
(
YˆH
Y ∗N
)β1
+ (1 − β1)Q pY
∗
N /(r − μ) + β1cP/r
β1 − β2
(
YˆH
Y ∗N
)β2
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<
QN − Q P
r − μ YˆH +
(
YˆH
Y ∗N
)β2 [
cN
r
− QN Y
∗
N
r − μ
]
. (7)
Denote the expected value (under Py) of operating in STW forever by FP (y), i.e.,
FP (y) = Ey
[∫ ∞
0
e−r t (Yt Q P − cP)dt
]
= Q P y
r − μ −
cP
r
.
Proposition 2 If Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied, then there is a unique pair (Y ∗L , Y ∗H ),
with Y ∗L < Y ∗N < Y ∗H , such that the stopping time τ ∗L,H in (5) solves the optimal stopping
problem (4). The triggers Y ∗L and Y ∗H are uniquely determined by the equations
(β2 − 1)Q P Y ∗L/(r − μ) − β2cP/r
(β1 − β2)(Y ∗L )β1
(Y ∗H )β1 +
(1 − β1)Q P Y ∗L/(r − μ) + β1cP/r
(β1 − β2)(Y ∗L )β2
(Y ∗H )β2
= F∗N (Y ∗H ) − FP (Y ∗H )
β1
(β2 − 1)Q P Y ∗L/(r − μ) − β2cP/r
(β1 − β2)(Y ∗L )β1
(Y ∗H )β1−1
+ β2 (1 − β1)Q P Y
∗
L/(r − μ) + β1cP/r
(β1 − β2)(Y ∗L )β2
(Y ∗H )β2−1
= ∂F
∗
N (Y
∗
H )
∂ y
− ∂FP (Y
∗
H )
∂ y
(8)
Furthermore, the value function is
F∗P (y) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if y ≤ Y ∗L
FP (y) + (Y
∗
H )
β1 yβ2 − yβ1(Y ∗H )β2
(Y ∗H )β1(Y ∗L )β2 − (Y ∗L )β1(Y ∗H )β2
[
− FP (Y ∗L )
]
+ y
β1(Y ∗L )β2 − (Y ∗L )β1 yβ2
(Y ∗H )β1(Y ∗L )β2 − (Y ∗L )β1(Y ∗H )β2
[
F∗N (Y ∗H ) − FP (Y ∗H )
] if Y ∗L < y < Y ∗H
F∗N (y) if y ≥ Y ∗H .
(9)
The proof of this proposition can be found in “Appendix A”. Note that it is always beneficial
to liquidate later under STW than without STW, because Y ∗L < Y ∗N
This value function again has an appealing intuitive interpretation. The payoffs for y ≤ Y ∗L
and y ≥ Y ∗H are the payoffs of immediate liquidation and producing at the normal level
(including the option value of liquidation), respectively. The value of the firm in the region
(Y ∗L , Y ∗H ) consists of three parts. The first part is the expected present value of never leaving
STW. The second part is the correction for liquidation at Y ∗L , multiplied by the expected
discount factor conditional on reaching Y ∗L before Y ∗H . The final part is the correction for
returning to normal production at Y ∗H , multiplied by the expected discount factor conditional
on reaching Y ∗H before Y ∗L .
2.3 The value of an active firm that has not yet used STW
An active firm that has not used STW yet is confronted with the problem of finding the
optimal time at which to exchange the expected present value of current production for
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the value of a firm that is using STW, F∗P . That is, the firm solves the optimal stopping
problem
F∗(y) = sup
τ∈M
Ey
[∫ τ
0
e−r t (QN Yt − cN )dt + e−rτ F∗P (Yτ )
]
. (10)
Note that the gain function is C1 and monotonically increasing, so that we should expect
the value function F∗ to be well-behaved. Intuitively, this problem should, again, have a
solution that takes the form of a trigger: enter STW as soon as the process (Yt )t≥0 reaches
some threshold Y ∗ from above.
In order to prove the existence of such a trigger we need to make an additional assumption
that ensures that the expected revenue of STW is sufficiently large. In particular, there must
exist states of the economy (i.e. prices y) for which the expected present value of STW
relative to normal operation fall sufficiently short of the expected present value of the cost
benefits.
Assumption 3 The expected revenue of STW is sufficiently large, in the sense that
Yˇ
QN − Q P
r − μ >
β1β2
(β1 − 1)(β2 − 1)
cN − cP
r
,
where
Yˇ =
[
1 − β2
β1(β1 − β2) Aˆ
QN − Q P
r − μ
] 1
β1−1
,
and Aˆ is as determined by (8) in Proposition 2.
Proposition 3 Suppose that Assumptions 1–3 hold. Then, in addition to the unique triggers
Y ∗L and Y ∗H , there exists a unique trigger Y ∗ < Y ∗H such that the stopping time τˇ (Y ∗) solves
the optimal stopping problem (10). Moreover, the corresponding value function is
F∗(y) =
{
F∗P (y) if y ≤ Y ∗
QN y
r−μ − cNr +
( y
Y ∗
)β2 [F∗P (Y ∗) + cNr − QN Y ∗r−μ
]
if y > Y ∗. (11)
The proof of this proposition can be found in “Appendix B”.
Proposition 3 only makes economic sense if it is optimal to adopt STW before it is optimal
to liquidate. This is – indeed – the case:
Corollary 1 Under the assumptions of Proposition 3 it holds that Y ∗ > Y ∗N .
The proof of this corollary is in “Appendix C”.
In Fig. 1, the triggers Y ∗L , Y ∗H , and Y ∗ are plotted for various values of cost reduction. It
looks like the liquidation threshold is only marginally influenced by STW. We will see later,
however, that the quantitative effect in terms of benefits of STW can be quite large.
3 The eﬀect of short-time work on liquidation probabilities
In this section we compute the probabilities of liquidation of a representative firm over a
certain period of time, based on data for several typical STW policies. In order to do so, we
need more detail on the firm and how its production technology uses the production factors.
Let’s assume that the firm uses a fixed amount of capital, K , and a fixed amount of labour, L .
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Fig. 1 Triggers for programme entry, programme exit, and default as a function of average production costs
in STW. The base case parameters are QN = 10, cN = 8, r = 0.04, μ = 0.03, and σ = 0.15. Note that in
the base case the average costs of normal production are 0.8
The production function of the firm is assumed to be of the Cobb–Douglas type with constant
returns to scale, i.e.
QN = K 1−γ Lγ .
For simplicity, we assume that the rental rate of capital is constant and equal to ρ, and
that the wage rate is constant at w. So, the flow paid to providers of capital (labour) is ρK
(wL). Therefore, cN = ρK +wL . For a given production level QN , the firm’s (static) profit
maximizing capital and labour inputs depend on the parameter γ . In particular,
L =
(
γ
1 − γ
ρ
w
)1−γ
QN , and K =
(
1 − γ
γ
w
ρ
)γ
QN .
Throughout this section we assume that K and L are chosen to maximize profits at production
level QN .
A STW programme is characterized by a number of parameters. First, there is the fraction
of worked hours that can be entered into STW, which we denote by α. This implies that
Q P = K 1−γ [(1 − α)L]γ = (1 − α)γ QN .
Secondly, the programme typically specifies the drop in the wage rate, which we denote by
1−ζ . So, for each non-worked hour the worker gets paid a fraction ζ . Thirdly, the government
usually only takes on a fraction η of the wage rate (after the reduction has been implemented),
leaving the firm to pay a fraction 1 − η. So, the cost flow of the firm drops to
cP = ρK + (1 − α)wL + α(1 − ζ )(1 − η)wL = cN − α(ζ + η − ζη)wL.
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Table 1 Two typical STW
policies Policy α ζ η
Nordic 0.63 0.78 0.17
Anglo-Saxon 0.38 0.62 0.32
Table 2 Base case parameter
values Parameter r μ σ ρ w QN
Value 0.04 0.02 0.25 0.06 0.06 10
Table 3 Values related to the
firm’s production process Variable γ Nordic Anglo-Saxon
K 0.25 13.1607 13.1607
0.50 10 10
0.75 4.3869 4.3869
L 0.25 4.3869 4.3869
0.50 10 10
0.75 13.1607 13.1607
Q P 0.25 7.7992 8.8736
0.50 6.0828 7.8740
0.75 4.7441 6.8970
cN 0.25 1.0529 1.0529
0.50 1.2 1.2
0.75 1.0529 1.0529
cP 0.25 0.9173 0.9787
0.50 0.8910 1.0309
0.75 0.6462 0.8303
Cahuc and Carcillo [7] catalogue the wide variety of STW practices in OECD countries.
These policies differ in virtually all relevant dimensions such as duration, maximum reduction
in the number of hours worked (α), maximum reduction in salary paid (1−ζ ) for non-worked
hours, and maximum fraction of salaries paid by the government (η). In order to analyse
different real-world policies we group together the Nordic countries and the Anglo-Saxon
countries and study the average policies in these groups. These data are all obtained from
Cahuc and Carcillo [7]. See Table 1 for details. Note that the main difference between these
policies is that the Nordic countries, typically, allow firms to cut into normal production
levels more deeply, while permitting lower salary reductions.
We consider three types of firms where we differentiate between the labour intensity of
the production process. In particular, we study the cases where γ = 0.25 (relatively capital
intensive), γ = 0.5, and γ = 0.75 (relatively labour intensive). The other parameters values
are given in Table 2. Note that all the STW policies in Table 1 satisfy Assumptions 1–3 with
these parameters.
For each firm we assume that QN = 10. In Table 3 we record the normal costs of production
(cN ), the profit maximizing capital and labour input levels (K and L), and production level
and costs in STW (Q P and cP ) under the different policies.
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Table 4 Triggers for various
STW policies Variable γ Nordic Anglo-Saxon
Y ∗N 0.25 0.0259 0.0259
0.50 0.0295 0.0295
0.75 0.0259 0.0259
Y ∗ 0.25 0.0455 0.0480
0.50 0.0566 0.0572
0.75 0.0541 0.0524
Y ∗L 0.25 0.0250 0.0254
0.50 0.0270 0.0282
0.75 0.0218 0.0240
Y ∗H 0.25 0.0887 0.0966
0.50 0.0840 0.1190
0.75 0.1206 0.1127
These typical policies lead to different thresholds and, thus, different probabilities of
eventual liquidation. The thresholds are reported in Table 4.
Figure 2 shows a sample path for the process (Yt )t≥0, which illustrates the goal of STW
policies. Here the current state of the economy is fairly low to start with and if no STW
were available the firm would liquidate in about 1.8 years’ time. With a Nordic style STW
programme, the firm, along this particular sample path, would enter STW after approximately
0.2 years, where it remains for approximately 4.7 years. After that period it returns to normal
production levels and, crucially, it is still productive after 5 years. Note that after about 2
years the firm almost liquidates, but the economy recovers in time to prevent liquidation from
being the optimal choice.
In order to judge the efficacy of different STW policies, we compute the following prob-
abilities:
1. that the firm liquidates within, say, T years, and
2. that the firm uses the STW measure within T years.
As long as Y0 ≡ y > Y ∗, it can easily be derived from results for arithmetic Brownian motion
as reported in, for example [12, Section 3.7], that these two probabilities are given by
Py
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∗
N
)
= 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− log(y/Y ∗N ) + (.5σ 2 − μ)T )
σ
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respectively. Here  denotes the distribution function of the standard normal distribution.
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Fig. 2 A sample path for the process (Yt )t≥0 with triggers based on the base case firm scenario and a Nordic-
style STW policy
The probability of liquidation within T years when the firm can use STW is very cumber-
some to compute analytically, because of the multiple conditionalities involved. Recall that
there are two possible liquidation scenarios:
1. the firm enters STW at Y ∗ after which Y ∗L is reached before Y ∗H , and
2. the firm enters STW at Y ∗ after which Y ∗H is reached before Y ∗L , and liquidation then
takes place as soon as Y ∗N is reached.
So, rather than pursuing analytical expressions for the liquidation probability in the presence
of STW, we obtain estimates of this liquidation probability by simulating 50,000 sample
paths.
For different values of y and T = 5 these liquidation probabilities are reported in Table 5.
The probabilities of entering STW are given in Table 6. As starting points we consider the
initial states 1.5Y ∗N (relatively weak economy), 2Y ∗N , and 3Y ∗N (relatively benign economy),
based on the threshold Y ∗N for the case γ = 1/2.
Note that under the Anglo-Saxon policy it is more likely that a firm enters the STW policy.
However, under the Nordic policy the probability of firm liquidation is lower than under the
Anglo-Saxon policy.
4 Welfare eﬀects of short-time work
In this section we compare the total value of the firm and the total discounted stream of wages
for workers under different STW scenarios. In order to do so, we need more detail on the
firm and how its revenues are split between workers, capitalists and shareholders, for which
we use the basic set-up used in Sect. 3. The surplus created by the firm (profit) is paid in full
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Table 5 Liquidation probabilities
(exact without STW, simulated
with STW) for various STW
policies
γ y No STW Nordic Anglo-Saxon
0.25 0.0442 0.3706 0.3374 0.3489
0.0589 0.1624 0.1528 0.1520
0.0884 0.0346 0.0288 0.0494
0.50 0.0442 0.5026 0.4109 0.4481
0.0589 0.2428 0.1866 0.2108
0.0884 0.0600 0.0406 0.0494
0.75 0.0442 0.3706 0.2288 0.2982
0.0589 0.1624 0.0880 0.1245
0.0884 0.0346 0.0152 0.0239
Table 6 Probabilities (exact) of
entering STW for various STW
policies
γ y Nordic Anglo-Saxon
0.25 0.0442 1 1
0.0589 0.6718 0.7392
0.0884 0.2630 0.3055
0.50 0.0442 1 1
0.0589 0.9488 0.9620
0.0884 0.4594 0.4703
0.75 0.0442 1 1
0.0589 0.8922 0.8513
0.0884 0.4144 0.3835
to the firm’s shareholders. The rental rate of capital, ρ, is, like the wage rate w, assumed to
be exogenously given.
The welfare effects of STW depend crucially on the way payoffs related to possible
future events (like entering STW, exiting STW and returning to normal production, etc.) are
discounted. For a firm operating in STW, denote
νˆy(Y ∗L , Y ∗H ) := Ey
[
e−r τˆ (Y ∗H )
∣∣∣τˆ (Y ∗H ) < τˇ (Y ∗L )
]
Py(τˆ (Y ∗H ) < τˇ (Y ∗L )), and
νˇy(Y ∗L , Y ∗H ) := Ey
[
e−r τˇ (Y ∗L )
∣∣∣τˆ (Y ∗H ) > τˇ (Y ∗L )
]
Py(τˆ (Y ∗H ) > τˇ (Y ∗L )).
In Proposition 2 we have already used the fact that (see, for example, [20, Section 5.9.1]):
νˆy(Y ∗L , Y ∗H ) =
yβ1(Y ∗L )β2 − (Y ∗L )β1 yβ2
(Y ∗H )β1(Y ∗L )β2 − (Y ∗L )β1(Y ∗H )β2
, and
νˇy(Y ∗L , Y ∗H ) =
(Y ∗H )β1 yβ2 − yβ1(Y ∗H )β2
(Y ∗H )β1(Y ∗L )β2 − (Y ∗L )β1(Y ∗H )β2
,
where β1 > 1 and β2 < 0 are the solutions to the quadratic equation (2).
We assume that unemployment incurs a sunk cost equal to a fraction χ of discounted
life-time earnings. It has been estimated [8] that χ = 0.11, increasing to χ = 0.19 in times
of recession. Denoting the present value of expected payouts to capitalists, workers, and
shareholders (all discounted at the same rate r ) by Vk , V, and Vs , respectively, we find the
following.
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Lemma 1 If the current value of the state-variable is y, then
Vk(y) =
[
1 −
(
y
Y ∗N
)β2] ρ
r
K ,
V(y) =
[
1 − (1 + χ)
(
y
Y ∗N
)β2] w
r
L, and
Vs(y) =
[
1 −
(
y
Y ∗N
)β2][ QN y
r − μ −
cN
r
]
.
We can now compute the value for each stakeholder (capitalist, worker, shareholder) under
an STW programme.
Lemma 2 If the current value of the state-variable is y, then
V ST Wk (y) =
⎡
⎣1 −
(
y
Y ∗N
)β2 ⎛⎝νˆY ∗(Y ∗L , Y ∗H )
(
Y ∗H
Y ∗N
)β2
+ νˇY ∗(Y ∗L , Y ∗H )
⎞
⎠
⎤
⎦ ρ
r
K ,
V ST W (y) =
{
1 +
( y
Y ∗
)β2[ − 1 + (1 − νˇY ∗(Y ∗L , Y ∗H ) − νˆY ∗(Y ∗L , Y ∗H )) (1 − α(1 − ζ ))
+ νˆY ∗(Y ∗L , Y ∗H )
(
1 −
(YH
Y ∗N
)β2) − χ(νˇY ∗(Y ∗L , Y ∗H ) + νˆY ∗(Y ∗L , Y ∗H )
(Y ∗H
Y ∗N
)β2)]}wL
r
V ST Ws (y) =
(
1 −
( y
Y ∗
)β2)( QN y
r − μ −
cN
r
)
+
( y
Y ∗
)β2 (
1 − νˆY ∗(Y ∗L , Y ∗H ) − νˇY ∗(Y ∗L , Y ∗H )
) ( Q P y
r − μ −
cP
r
)
+
( y
Y ∗
)β2
νˆY ∗(Y ∗L , Y ∗H )
⎛
⎝1 −
(
Y ∗H
Y ∗N
)β2⎞⎠( QN y
r − μ −
cN
r
)
.
The proof can be found in “Appendix E”.
Typically, nordic STW programmes look more generous to workers in that they allow
for a higher reduction in wage costs, lower reductions in salaries paid, and higher fractions
of salaries paid for by the government. This would suggest that workers are better off in
Nordic countries whereas shareholders are better off in Anglo-Saxon countries. The numerical
analysis below shows that this intuition is incorrect.
The values to different stakeholders depend on the current price level in the market. Again
we consider the initial states 1.5Y ∗N , 2Y ∗N , and 3Y ∗N , based on the threshold Y ∗N for the case
γ = 1/2. The values to each stakeholder of the different policies are reported in Tables 7, 8,
9 and 10.
This numerical analysis indicates, firstly, that the biggest beneficiaries of STW are the
capitalists. The benefit to workers is actually often negative. The intuition for this seeming
paradox is simple: labour is the only production factor that is reduced in STW. By saving on
wage costs the firm increases its life-span and, thus, the period of time during which the full
rental costs of capital can be paid.
The occasional negative benefit to labour occurs because the decrease in the present value
of sunk costs of unemployment is more than off-set by the decrease in the present value of
the reduction in wages over the STW period. Note that the latter are discounted less than the
former.
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Table 7 Value to capitalists (%
change relative to no STW in
brackets)
γ y No STW Nordic Anglo-Saxon
0.25 0.0442 7.9791 8.2935 (3.94) 8.1727 (2.43)
0.0589 10.8319 11.0660 (2.16) 10.9724 (1.30)
0.0884 13.7182 13.8765 (1.15) 13.8132 (0.69)
0.50 0.0442 4.8595 5.6241 (15.73) 5.2603 (8.25)
0.0589 7.3190 7.8465 (7.21) 7.5944 (3.76)
0.0884 9.8074 10.1640 (3.63) 9.9936 (1.90)
0.75 0.0442 2.6597 3.2068 (20.57) 2.9136 (9.55)
0.0589 3.6106 3.9978 (10.72) 3.7907 (4.99)
0.0884 4.5727 4.8344 (5.72) 4.6945 (2.66)
Table 8 Value to workers,
including sunk costs of
unemployment (% change
relative to no STW in brackets)
γ y No STW Nordic Anglo-Saxon
0.25 0.0442 2.2284 2.1561 (−3.25) 2.0901 (−6.21)
0.0589 3.2840 3.2224 (−1.88) 3.1577 (−3.84)
0.0884 4.3519 4.3103 (−0.96) 4.2666 (−1.96)
0.50 0.0442 3.7441 4.1049 (9.64) 3.7177 (−0.70)
0.0589 6.4741 6.5215 (0.73) 6.2366 (−3.67)
0.0884 9.2362 9.2683 (0.35) 9.0757 (−1.74)
0.75 0.0442 6.6853 7.6319 (14.16) 6.7548 (1.04)
0.0589 9.8519 10.2969 (4.52) 9.5610 (−1.38)
0.0884 13.0557 13.3565 (2.30) 12.9637 (−0.70)
Table 9 Value to workers,
excluding sunk costs of
unemployment (% change
relative to no STW in brackets)
γ y No STW Nordic Anglo-Saxon
0.25 0.0442 2.6597 2.5759 (−3.15) 2.5143 (−5.47)
0.0589 3.6106 3.5405 (−1.94) 3.4793 (−3.69)
0.0884 4.5727 4.5253 (−1.04) 4.4839 (−1.94)
0.50 0.0442 4.8595 5.1363 (5.69) 4.7891 (−1.45)
0.0589 7.3190 7.3084 (−0.15) 7.0512 (−3.66)
0.0884 9.8074 9.8002 (−0.07) 9.6264 (−1.85)
0.75 0.0442 7.9791 8.7452 (9.60) 7.9649 (−0.18)
0.0589 10.8319 11.1492 (2.93) 10.6364 (−1.80)
0.0884 13.7182 13.9327 (1.56) 13.5861 (−0.96)
Secondly, the firm chooses its policy to maximize the value to shareholders, so it is no
surprise that this value is positively affected by STW.
Next, all stakeholders are better off in the typical Nordic scenario than the typical Anglo-
Saxon scenario. This suggest that more generous STW programmes do not necessarily hurt
capitalists and shareholders. The reason for this might be that, even though firms under a
Nordic policy pay more for non-worked hours, they are also allowed to reduce the number
of hours worked more.
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Table 10 Value to shareholders
(% change relative to no STW in
brackets)
γ y No STW Nordic Anglo-Saxon
0.25 0.0442 3.7633 3.9231 (4.25) 3.8687 (2.80)
0.0589 9.1969 9.3183 (1.32) 9.2785 (0.89)
0.0884 21.9765 22.0586 (0.37) 22.0317 (0.25)
0.50 0.0442 2.4242 2.9588 (22.05) 2.7068 (11.66)
0.0589 7.2904 7.7709 (6.59) 7.5495 (3.55)
0.0884 19.4959 19.8208 (1.67) 19.6711 (0.90)
0.75 0.0442 3.7633 4.7392 (25.93) 4.2104 (11.88)
0.0589 9.1967 10.0047 (8.78) 9.5610 (3.96)
0.0884 21.9765 22.5226 (2.48) 22.2226 (1.12)
As a final note, observe that since in the Cobb–Douglas technology capital and labour
are interchangeable, an alternative to STW could be to negotiate a “pay holiday” between
the firm and the capitalists. In such a scenario the roles between capital and labour would
be reversed and it would be the workers who are more protected against a drop in the firm’s
value. Of course, a combination of the two approaches would share the losses more equally.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we studied a firm that can make use of a short-time work programme. Using a
real options approach we derived the optimal thresholds for the firm to adopt STW and, once
entered, when to exit and revert to normal production levels, or to liquidate. The liquidation
threshold is computed both when the firm is using STW and when it is not. We show that a
firm that is using STW will liquidate later than a firm that is not using it.
In practice, details of STW are highly variable between (OECD) countries. Our numerical
computations are based on three different scenarios. One takes the STW details as they are
common in Northern European countries. The second scenario looks at the way STW has been
implemented typically in Anglo-Saxon countries. We take the point of view of a government
and calculate the benefits to society of STW by a dynamic benefit-to-cost ratio and find that
the dBCR is typically very small and far below unity. This happens because the benefits of
STW accrue later in time than when the costs are incurred and are, thus, discounted more.
This shows the importance of a stochastic dynamic approach to analysing such measures.
We also study the value of STW to different stakeholders in the firm. It turns out that
workers are actually the worst off. STW is better for capitalists and shareholders. This happens
because STW extends the life of the firm, so that capitalists get fully paid throughout that
time while workers receive lower wages. Shareholders benefit through the option value that
is generated by the presence of STW. We suggest that a “pay holiday” on capital goods
payments could lead to similar results as STW but would protect the worker more. This
suggests that a balanced approach may provide a better balance between costs and benefits
of STW.
We list three possible extensions of this research. First, it would be interesting to make
the duration that the firms can use STW time dependent. With such a model one could
calculate the optimal duration of the programme both from a firm’s and society perspective.
Second, one could investigate what the effect would be from the possibility to make use of
the programme more than once. Would firms adopt STW earlier? Would they exit earlier?
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Would this be beneficial for society? Third, it could be interesting to study the effect of STW
in a competitive setting. How is the entry threshold of one firm affected by actions of other
firms? What if a firm is in competition with another firm that is based in a country where
STW measures do not exist? Finally, this paper has not addressed the effect of STW on
the labour market. An important question to be asked is whether STW unfairly advantages
workers employed in firms that have access to STW over workers who are not.
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Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 2
1. The optimal stopping problem (4) can be written as
F∗P (y) =
Q P y
r − μ −
c
r
+ sup
τ
Ey
[
e−rτ max {GL(Yτ ), G H (Yτ )}
]
, (12)
where
GL(y) = −FP (y) = cP
r
− Q P y
r − μ, and
G H (y) = F∗N (y) − FP (y) =
QN − Q P
r − μ y −
cN − cP
r
+
(
y
Y ∗N
)β2 [cN
r
− QN Y
∗
N
r − μ
]
.
Note that G H (y) > GL(y) if, and only if, y > Y ∗N , and that G H (Y ∗N ) = GL(Y ∗N ) and
G ′H (Y ∗N ) = G ′L(Y ∗N ). Hence, the gain function y → max{GL(y), G H (y)} is C1 everywhere.
Define the function G : R+ → R by
G(y) = 1y≤Y ∗N GL(y) + 1y>Y ∗N G H (y),
so that G = GL ∨ G H . Note that G is C2 onR+\{Y ∗N }.
2. From Peskir and Shiryaev [18] it follows that we need to find a set C ⊂ R+ and a function
F∗P ∈ C2(R+\∂C ), which dominates G onR+, that solve the free-boundary problem⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
L F∗P − r F∗P = 0 on C
F∗P > G on C , and F∗P = G onR+\C
∂F∗P
∂ y |∂C
= ∂G
∂ y |∂C
.
(13)
Here L denotes the characteristic operator of (Yt )t≥0, i.e., for any ϕ ∈ C2,
L ϕ(y) = 1
2
σ 2 y2ϕ′′(y) + μϕ′(y).
3. OnR+, define the functions ϕˆ : R+ → R+ and ϕˇ : R+ → R+, by
ϕˆ(y) = yβ1 , and ϕˇ(y) = yβ2 . (14)
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Note that ϕˆ and ϕˇ are the increasing and decreasing solutions, respectively, to the differential
equation L ϕ − rϕ = 0. So, any solution to L ϕ − rϕ = 0 is of the form
ϕ(y) = Aˆϕˆ(y) + Aˇϕˇ(y),
where Aˆ and Aˇ are arbitrary constants. Furthermore, it is easily obtained that
ϕˆ′(y) = β1
y
ϕˆ(y) > 0, ϕˇ′(y) = β2
y
ϕˇ(y) < 0, and
ϕˆ′′(y) = β1(β1 − 1)
y2
ϕˆ(y) > 0, ϕˇ′′(y) = β2(β2 − 1)
y2
ϕˇ(y) > 0.
4. Fix YL ≤ Y ∗N and define the mapping y → V (y; YL ), by
V (y; YL ) = Aˆ(YL)ϕˆ(y) + Aˇ(YL)ϕˇ(y), (15)
where the constants Aˆ(YL) and Aˇ(YL) are given by
Aˆ(YL) = ϕˇ(YL)G
′
L(YL) − ϕˇ′(YL)GL(YL)
ϕˇ(YL)ϕˆ′(YL) − ϕˇ′(YL)ϕˆ(YL) =
(β2 − 1)Q P YL/(r − μ) − β2cP/r
(β1 − β2)Y β1L
, (16)
and
Aˇ(YL) = ϕˆ
′(YL)GL(YL) − ϕˆ(YL)G ′I (YL)
ϕˇ(YL)ϕˆ′(YL) − ϕˇ′(YL)ϕˆ(YL) =
(1 − β1)Q P YL/(r − μ) + β1cP/r
(β1 − β2)Y β2L
. (17)
Note that L V (y; YL) − r V (y; YL) = 0 for all y ∈ R+. In addition, the function V satisfies
V (YL ; YL) = GL(YL) and V ′(YL ; YL ) = G ′L(YL).
It is easily seen that
Aˇ(YL) > 0, and Aˇ′(YL) > 0.
In addition, Assumption 1 ensures that for all YL ≤ Y ∗N , it holds that
Aˆ(YL) > 0, and Aˆ′(YL) < 0.
5. So, the mapping y → V (y; Y ∗N ) is a (strictly) convex function, which satisfies V (·; Y ∗N ) →
∞ as y → ∞ or y ↓ 0. Hence, there is a unique point YˆH > Y ∗N , such that V ′(YH ; Y ∗N ) =
G ′H (YH ). This is exactly the value YˆH determined by (7) in Assumption 2. This assumption
then ensures that V (YH ; Y ∗N ) < G H (YH ). Also, since V is more convex than G H for large
y, it holds that V (y; Y ∗N ) > G H (y) for y large enough.
6. Since Aˆ(YL) decreases and Aˇ(YL) increases in YL , the mapping y → V (y; YL ) has the
property that for every y > YL it holds that ∂V (y; YL)/∂YL < 0. So, the point YH ∈ (Y ∗N ,∞)
where V ′(YH ; YL) = G ′H (YH ) is decreasing in YL , as is the value V (YH ; YL ). Now decrease
YL from Y ∗N to 0. There will be a unique Y ∗L , with corresponding Y ∗H at which V (Y ∗H ; Y ∗L ) =
G H (Y ∗H ) and V ′(Y ∗H ; Y ∗L ) = G ′H (Y ∗H ).
7. The interval C = (Y ∗L , Y ∗H ) and the proposed function F∗P = V (·; Y ∗L ) together solve the
free-boundary problem (13). The fact that Y ∗L and Y ∗H are the unique triggers that make F∗P
a C1 function on (Y ∗L , Y ∗H ) follows by construction. unionsq
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 3
First note that for y ∈ [Y ∗L , Y ∗H ] we can write
F∗P (y) = FP (y) + Ayβ1 + Byβ2 .
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This implies that the first-order condition for maximizing F∗(·) can be written as g(y) = 0,
where
g(y) = −β2[FP (y)−FN (y)+ Ayβ1 +Byβ2 ] + y[F ′P (y) − F ′N (y) + β1 Ayβ1−1 + β2 Byβ2−1]
= −β2[FP (y) − FN (y)] + y[F ′P (y) − F ′N (y)] + (β1 − β2)Ayβ1 .
Since
g′(y) = (1 − β2) Q P − QN
r − μ + β1(β1 − β2)Ay
β1−1,
and
g′′(y) = β1(β1 − 1)(β1 − β2)Ayβ1−2 > 0,
g(·) is a strictly convex function, which can, therefore, have at most two zeros.
The minimum location of g(·) on [Y ∗L , Y ∗H ] can be found analytically:
g′(y) = 0 ⇐⇒ yβ1−1 = 1 − β2
β1(β1 − β2)A
QN − Q P
r − μ = 0
⇐⇒ y =
[
1 − β2
β1(β1 − β2)A
QN − Q P
r − μ
] 1
β1−1 ≡ Yˇ .
We then find that
g(Yˇ ) = (1 − β2) Q P − QN
r − μ Yˇ + (β1 − β2)AYˇ
β1 + β2 cP − cN
r
= Yˇ
[
(1 − β2) Q P − QN
r − μ + (β1 − β2)AYˇ
β1−1
]
+ β2 cP − cN
r
= Yˇ
[
(1 − β2) Q P − QN
r − μ + (β1 − β2)A
1 − β2
β1(β1 − β2)A
QN − Q P
r − μ
]
+ β2 cP − cN
r
= Yˇ QN − Q P
r − μ
(
−(1 − β2) + 1 − β2
β1
)
+ β2 cP − cN
r
= Yˇ QN − Q P
r − μ
(1 − β1)(1 − β2)
β1
+ β2 cP − cN
r
< 0,
where the last inequality follows from Assumption 3.
Define
f (y) = FP (y) − FN (y) + Ayβ1 + Byβ2 .
Since A(Y ∗H )β1 + B(Y ∗H )β2 = F∗N (Y ∗H ) − FP (Y ∗H ), it holds that
f (Y ∗H ) = FP (Y ∗H ) − FN (Y ∗H ) + A(Y ∗H )β1 + B(Y ∗H )β2
= F∗N (Y ∗H ) − FN (Y ∗H ) =
(
Y ∗H
Y ∗N
)β2
[−FN (Y ∗N )],
and
f ′(Y ∗H ) = β2
(
Y ∗H
Y ∗N
)β2 1
Y ∗H
[−FN (Y ∗N )].
We, therefore, find that
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g(Y ∗H ) = −β2 f (Y ∗H ) + Y ∗H f ′(Y ∗H )
= (1 − β2)
(
Y ∗H
Y ∗N
)β2
[−FN (Y ∗N )] > 0.
So, g(·) has a zero at Y∗ ∈ (Yˇ , Y ∗H ), which represents a minimum of F∗(·).
The function F∗(·) has a (unique) maximum at some Y ∗ ∈ (Y ∗L , Yˇ ) if and only if g(Y ∗L ) >
0. Note that
f (Y ∗L ) = FP (Y ∗L ) − FN (Y ∗L ) + A(Y ∗L )β1 + B(Y ∗L )β2
= FP (Y ∗L ) − FN (Y ∗L ) + [−FP (Y ∗L )] = −FN (Y ∗L ),
and
f ′(Y ∗L ) = −F ′N (Y ∗L ),
which implies that
g(Y ∗L ) = −β2[−FN (Y ∗L )] + Y ∗L [−F ′N (Y ∗L )].
At Y ∗N it holds that −β2[−FN (Y ∗N )] + Y ∗N [−F ′N (Y ∗N )] = 0,
since Y ∗N is a maximum location of F∗N (·). It, therefore holds that g(Y ∗L ) > 0 ⇐⇒ Y ∗L < Y ∗N .unionsq
Appendix C: Proof of Corollary 1
Let
Y ∗P =
β2
β2 − 1
r − μ
Q P
cP
r
.
That is, τˇ (Y ∗P ) solves the optimal stopping problem
G∗(y) = sup
τ∈M
Ey
[∫ τ
0
e−r t (Yt Q P − cP )dt
]
.
Recall the function g from the proof of Proposition 3. At Y ∗ it holds that g(Y ∗) = 0, i.e.
that
β2[FP (Y ∗) − FN (Y ∗)] = Y ∗[F ′P (Y ∗) − F ′N (Y ∗)] + (β1 − β2)A(Y ∗)β1
⇐⇒ β2[−FN (Y ∗)] − Y ∗[−F ′N (Y ∗)]
= − [−β2(−FP (Y ∗)) + Y ∗(−F ′P (Y ∗))] + (β1 − β2)A(Y ∗)β1 . (18)
Since at Y ∗P it holds that
−β2[−FP (Y ∗P )] + Y ∗P [−F ′P (Y ∗P )] = 0,
Y ∗P is a maximum location, and Y ∗ > Y ∗P , we have that the term between square brackets on
the right-hand side of (18) is negative. Therefore, the right-hand side of (18) is positive.
This implies that
−β2[FP (Y ∗) + FN (Y ∗)] < 0.
Since Y ∗N solves −β2[FP (Y ∗) + FN (Y ∗)] = 0,
and Y ∗N is a maximum location it, therefore, holds that Y ∗ > Y ∗N . unionsq
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Appendix D: Proof of Lemma 1
For any Y and y < Y , let τˆy(Y ) denote the first hitting time from below of Y under Py .
Similarly, for any Y and y > Y , let τˇy(Y ) denote the first hitting time from above of Y under
Py . For any y > Y ∗N , we then find that
Vk(y) =Ey
[∫ τˇy(Y ∗N )
0
e−r tρK dt
]
=
(
1 − Ey
[
e−r τˇy(Y ∗N )
])
Ey
[∫ ∞
0
e−r tρK dt
]
=
(
1 −
(
y
Y ∗N
)β2) ρ
r
K .
The other values are computed in the same way, taking into account that the labour factor
incurs a sunk cost equal to a fraction χ of life-time discounted expected labour income. That
is, the sunk costs equal
χEy
[∫ ∞
τˇy(Y ∗N )
e−r twLdt
]
= χEy
[
e−r τˇy(Y ∗N )
]
Ey
[∫ ∞
0
wLdt
]
= χ
(
y
Y ∗N
)β2 w
r
L.
unionsq
Appendix E: Proof of Lemma 2
The proof follows along similar lines as the proof of the previous lemma, i.e. by carefully
discounting expected infinite streams of payoffs. Denote
DK (y) = Ey
[∫ ∞
0
e−r tρK dt
]
= ρ
r
K ,
DL N (y) = Ey
[∫ ∞
0
e−r twLdt
]
= w
r
L,
DL P (y) = Ey
[∫ ∞
0
e−r t [(1 − α)wL + α(1 − ζ )wL]dt
]
= 1 − αζ
r
wL,
DSN (y) = Ey
[∫ ∞
0
e−r t (QN Yt − cN )dt
]
= QN y
r − μ −
cN
r
, and
DSP (y) = Ey
[∫ ∞
0
e−r t (Q P Yt − cP )dt
]
= Q P y
r − μ −
cP
r
.
The providers of capital get paid a stream ρK until the firm liquidates. This happens either
if the firms enters the STW programme and then hits the threshold YL , or if the firm enters
the programme, then hits the threshold YH and then hits the threshold Y ∗N . That is,
V ST Wk (y) = Ey
[ ∫ τˇy(Y ∗)+τˇY∗ (YL )
0
e−r tρK dt
∣∣∣τˇY ∗(YL) < τˆY ∗(YH )
]
PY ∗(τˇY ∗(YL) < τˆY ∗(YH ))
+ Ey
[ ∫ τˇy(Y ∗)+τˆY∗ (YH )+τˇY∗ (Y ∗N )
0
e−r tρK dt
∣∣∣τˇY ∗(YL) > τˆY ∗(YH )
]
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PY ∗(τˇY ∗(YL) > τˆY ∗(YH ))
= ρ
r
K
{
1 −
( y
Y ∗
)β2[
νˇY ∗(YL , YH ) + νˆY ∗(YL , YH )
(YH
Y ∗N
)β2]}
.
The providers of labour receive a flow wL while the firm operates normally and a flow
(1 − α + αζ)wL = (1 − αζ)wL while the firm operates in STW. Therefore, assuming that
y > Y ∗, it holds that
V ST W (y) = Ey
[ ∫ τˆy (Y ∗)
0
e−r twLdt
]
+ Ey
[ ∫ τˆy (Y ∗)+τˇY∗ (YL )∧τˆY∗ (YH )
τˆy (Y ∗)
(1 − α(1 − ζ ))wLdt
]
+ Ey
[ ∫ τˆy (Y ∗)+τˆY∗ (YH )+τˇYH (Y ∗N )
τˆy (Y ∗)+τˆY∗ (YH )
e−rdtwLdt
∣∣∣τˆY ∗ (YH ) < τˇY ∗ (YL )
]
PY ∗ (τˆY ∗ (YH ) < τˇY ∗ (YL ))
−
{
Ey
[
e−r(τˆy (Y ∗)+τˆY∗ (YH ))
∣∣∣τˆY ∗ (YH ) < τˇY ∗ (YL )
]
PY ∗ (τˆY ∗ (YH ) < τˇY ∗ (YL ))
+ Ey
[
e−r(τˆy (Y ∗)+τˇY∗ (YL ))
∣∣∣τˆY ∗ (YH ) > τˇY ∗ (YL )
]
PY ∗ (τˆY ∗ (YH ) > τˇY ∗ (YL ))
}
χ
wL
r
=
(
1 −
( y
Y ∗
)β2) wL
r
+
( y
Y ∗
)β2 (1 − νˇY ∗ (YL , YH ) − νˆY ∗ (YL , YH )) (1 − α(1 − ζ ))wL
r
+
( y
Y ∗
)β2
νˆY ∗ (YL , YH )
⎛
⎝1 −
(
YH
Y ∗N
)β2⎞⎠ wL
r
− χ
⎛
⎝νˇY ∗ (YL , YH ) + νˆY ∗ (YL , YH )
(
YH
Y ∗N
)β2⎞⎠ wL
r
,
from which the result follows immediately.
Finally, the value accruing to shareholders follows in a similar way and is already discussed
in detail in Sect. 2. unionsq
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